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Chapter pages in book: (p. 159 - 176)9.Causes of Fluctuation in Owners/zip: The Sales Link
The observations based on time series and
described in the previous five chapters have
relevance to two major groups of questions:
the objectives, problems, and procedures that
govern purchasing and inventories in busi-
ness enterprises and their implications with
•respect to patterns of fluctuation; the impact
of this behavior on economic fluctuation in
the economy at large. This and the following
two chapters explore and analyze thefirst
group of considerations. Chapter 12 tackles
the second group, though in a cursory fashion.
The final chapter of the book asks how the
interaction of the two sorts of processes—busi-
ness conduct and aggregative impact—may be
more adequately understood and effectively
explored.
HYPOTHESES AND PROCEDURES
The actual behavior of stocks and ownership
as displayed by the time series needs to be
analyzed in terms of the business objectives
and managerial problems that give rise to it.
What these may be was discussed at the out-
setofthestudy.Severalgeneralizations
emerged. Though they require a great deal of
further testing and specification, I want simply
to use them here as a point of departure.
Generalizations A bout Factors That
Influence Stocks
1. Stocks on order are an integral part of
the stock management problem. Since pur-
chasing or refraining from purchasing mate-
rials is the most direct and usual act by which
a stock objective is achieved, stocks must be
planned in terms of the time required for
purchases to be delivered as well as in terms
of the time required for processing and mar-
keting operations to take place. Accordingly,
if the behavior of stock is to be linked with
the business procedures that give rise to it,
it is necessary to focus on both stocks on hand
and those on order—to focus, that is, on own-
ership as well as on each of its two parts.
The size of stocks on hand and on order,
individually and collectively, is influenced by
what is known and what is expected concern-
ing the specifics of several sorts of business
problems and the behavior of the several sorts
of business costs.
2. The volume of sales is an important de-
terminant of the volume of stocks that should
be held on hand or on order. However, the
ideal relationship is not that of a constant
ratio. When sales rise, total stocks do not .need
to rise as much as proportionately; nor do
they need to fall as much when sales fall. A
proportionate change is required for the part
of stocks that serve to sustain the period re-
quired for processing, whether the process in-
volved is that of manufacture, of preparation
of raw materials, or of delivery by the supplier
to the purchasing company. But for the por-
tion of total stocks that serve various sorts of
insurance and efficiency functions, appropriate160 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
variation is ordinarily substantially less than
proportionate to sales.
3. Whatever the specific objective with re-
spect to sales, there are bound to be disparities
between actual and ideally desired stocks on
hand and on order. Disparities of the "passive"
variety tolerated or perhaps not recognized;
ifclearly "unintended,"effortstoreverse
them are made. They are of several sorts:
The disparity will reflect the relation be-
tween the sales that are expected at the time
when orders have to be placed and the sales
that actually occur. The disparity is likely to
be less for total ownership than for either of
its parts, since the inflow, new orders, can
be readily adjusted to the outflow, sales. The
upward adjustment can be made almost at
will. The downward adjustment may be a bit
more circumscribed, but nevertheless speedy
compared with the adjustment of stock alone.
The disparity will reflect the procedures
that it is worthwhile to institute for the pur-
pose of defining, correcting, or even detecting
undesired change in stock. These procedures
have an opportunity cost in terms of manage-
ment time and the exacerbation of other ma-
agement problems. Simple ineptitude may
cause large disparities.
The difference between actual stocks and
their ideal sales-linked level will also reflect
other factors that are intended to influence
their size, factors mentioned in the following
two paragraphs. It reflects also failures to fore-
tell these other factors precisely.
4. Changes in stocks can reflect changes in
cost both of stocks and of other ways of serving
the management function that stocks serve.
An example of the first is the changing cost
of financing stock. This includes not merely
the interest charges often examined in this
context but also the opportunity cost of in-
ternal funds, which may have their own pat-
terns of variation as funds from retained prof-
its rise or fall. Examples of the second are:
the higher cost, when factories are busy, of
minimizing stocks by means of flexible produc-
tion schedules; the lower cost of obsolescence
of stocks acquired to cover sales for which ad-
vance orders have been taken.
5. Changes in stocks on hand and on order
can reflect changing conditions in or expecta-
tions concerning the markets in which mate-
rials are bought. Such conditions include the
expected price of materials, speed and relia-
bility of deliveries, and the adequacy of selec-
tions or the reliability with which quality
specifications are met. Stocks on order typi-
cally reflect most of the initial impact of such
change.
Methods of Study
The time series examined in Part II have
displayed two basic characteristics that gen-
eralizations based on the firms-eye view of
stocks suggest: the importance of stocks on
order and their strong patterns of fluctuation;
and a behavior that does not simply mirror
sales. Evidence on these two general points
appeared in all sorts of specific forms.
ECONOMETRICS TABLED
It would now be possible to take a further
step and make some guesses about what sorts
of things accountfor the behavior unex-
plained by the sales link. These hunches could
be dignified by a formal hypothesis which
then might be submitted for econometric test.
However, there are several reasons why it
would be foolish at this point to follow this
pedigreed procedure. For one thing, there is
much more preliminary work to be done in
order to weed out some and underscore others
of the many factors that may, according to
my basic view, play a part in causing fluctua-
tions in ownership.
Further, the basic view is resistant to well-
founded hypothesizing. On the one hand, it
holds that a great many things can influence
the size of stocks. On the other hand, it pro-
vides only a shaky a priori basis for selecting
which are likely to be quantitatively impor-
tant. For one thing, the judgment can at the
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siderations and not on sound knowledge about
actual business behavior. For another, the
judgment implies knowledge of the business
conditions that prevailed during the period
under study—how significantly what sorts of
costs were actually expected to change in what
way. As a result of this inability to arrive at a
confident hypothesis by deduction, we need to
coax the time series to go as far as they can
to narrow down alternative explanations.
But even after this further specification has
been completed, it is still not at all clear that
econometric analysis of the time series pres-
ently available would advance the inquiry very
far. In any event, it is not undertaken in this
study.
There are two chief difficulties which in
the context of our particular problems ag-
gravate the perennial headaches associated
with multivariate analysis of time series:
The Data. The statistics for durables manu-
facture are, as has been pointed out, inade-
quately matched. Directions of change are,
Ibelieve, fairly reliably indicated, but the
volumes involved are not. Statistics in book-
value terms increase the difficulty still further.
In consequence, quantitative comparisons are
very risky, both with respect to the relations of
the various stockpiles to one another and with
respect to each of their relations to shipments
and orders. The difficulty of proper empirical
representation is still more acute in connec-
tion with some of the other variables for which
the theory calls: forecasts of sales, actual and
expected change in replenishment time, ex-
pected materials prices, financing costs, and
other opportunity costs such as that of flexible
employment schedules.
Multidirectional Causal Relationships. Yet
in spite of the indubitable deficiencies of avail-
able proxies for the independent variables, it
is not at all clear whether the multivariate
analysis would under- or overstate their true
explanatory value. On the one hand, the causal
relations at an aggregate level are multidirec-
tional:the accumulation of inventories in-
fluence market expectations concerning de-
livery times and prices as well as vice versa;
the level of sales influences the cost of financ-
ing, which influences the size of stocks, which
influences the cost of financing, and so on.1
On the other hand, these multidirectional
influences follow no prescribed temporal se-
quence. The association in time may be im-
mediate as well as anticipatory or lagged. Con-
sequently, the coefficient of whichever variable
is designated "independent" will actually re-
flect a zigzag of cause and effect between in-
dependent and dependent parameters.
Finally, each of the broad aggregates is re-
sponsive to the general level and temper of
business conditions. In consequence, some por-
tion of the displayed association between in-
dependent and dependent variables reflects
the association of each with general business
conditions. This problem is, of course, intrin-
sic to any effort to impute causal connection
on the basis of temporal parallelism. In a
crude form I have, as indicated earlier, kept
it in mind in judging whether, in a par-
ticular case, the percentage of months in like
phase seems to suggest a "close" relationship.
Other things the same, it does so more strongly
when conformity of both series to reference
chronology is poor than when it is good. For
formal correlation analysis the problem can
falsify both the regression coefficients as typi-
cally interpreted and the multiple and partial
correlation coefficients. Techniques for sub-
duing the difficulty are not, as far as I know,
in use.2
1Equationsystems are, of course, directed toward
dealing with this problem, but the extent to which
they succeed appears to be highly problematical. For
one thing, prerequisite to success is adequate repre-
sentation of all of the important causal elements.
2Considera simple regression of Y on X. The
measures of significance and correlation express in
some form the proportion of the deviation of each of
the y, y, which is ex-
plained by, on the one hand, some designated sys-
tematic association with corresponding x values and,
on the other hand, left unexplained.
The deviation of the y's from their average reflects
analytically distinct influences:(1) the impact on Y
of general business conditions via their influence on
demand, business mood, supply, finance, arid so on; (2)162 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
There is a third impediment to multivari-
ate analysis which I can only mention very
tentatively. The importance of expectations
in the causal nexus with which we are con-
cerned casts doubt on the appropriateness of
linear models. The final chapter explores the
question further.
A FLEXIBLE DIALOGUE
For these many reasons, then,I aim at
modest and preliminary goals: to focus the
empirical findings on the factors that influ-
ence inventory and purchasing procedures
by means of a flexible dialogue between the
statistical data and the logic of management
problems and procedures. We aim to arrive
at answers, admittedly tentative answers, which
are as specific and precise as the data permit.
I might add that I shall frequently go farther
than the data permit. No investigator can
adequately curb his prejudiced enthusiasms.
This is one reason why "facts" are such rela-
tive things.
In the main, the statistics provide four han-
dles by means of which one may attempt to
draw the figures and the explanation of be-
havior together:
the mpact of X on Y; (3) the impact of other par-
ticular influences that failto be represented in the
equation or equation system;(4)residual(theo.
retically unexplained) random element.
But each matching value of X and Y share in some
degree influence1.Ifso,thecorrelation and re-
gressioncoefficientsthataredevelopedreflectnot
only the influence of X on Y (influence 2), but also
the influence of general business conditions on both
X and V. Coefficients reflect only these influences if
we can assume that there is no causal influence of Y
on X, and no other independent influences correlated
with X which have been omitted (influence 8). For
broad economic aggregates, influence 1can be large
and consequently produce high measures of correla-
tion, even if the "true" association between Y and X
is quite small. For narrow aggregates, data for in-
-dividual industries or geographic areas, the influence
of general business conditions may belessstrong
(relative to the influences that are isolated) or they
may simply be different—the general affairs of the
industry or the region.
To correct for influence I, it seems to be necessary
to isolate that portion of the total standard deviation
of Y's subject to the particular explanation which the
1. The over-all pattern of fluctuation of
stocks and its gross correspondence with that
of data to which it is hypothetically causally
related.
2. The distinction between these relations
in the case of stocks on hand and those on
order; the logic of behavior calls for differ-
ences which evidence could confirm or deny.
3. The distinction between the relations
among stocks and explanatory variables for
department stores and for durable goods man-
ufacturers; here again the logic of behavior
calls for differences which the evidence could
confirm or deny.
4. Finally, a distinction that lies outside of
the main scope of this work, but one on which
scattered light can be shed, concerns differ-
ences between other business expansions and
the one starting in early 1961; until some
time in 1964, this expansion was notably lack-
ing in the usual buildup of optimistic market
expectations, and this presumably would cause
distinctive behavior of stocks on hand and on
order.
In this chapter I concentrate on the associa-
tion between sales and stocks, either on hand
regression proffers. Conversely, it is necessary to specify
that portion of the total deviation which is explicable
without recourse to the particular explanation that
the regression proffers, the portion reflecting the im-
pact on Y and X of the general business climate. As a
result ofthis impact, Y and X would have some
specified chance of conforming in some specified degree
to the time pattern traced by a group of series of a
like order of generality. What this pattern may be
could be determined in a number of ways. But the
raw materials for the determination would seem to be
a bank of series of like order of generality. From
these one could evolve, by simulation or other methods,
a generalized pattern and a probability distribution
of the degree of divergence of individual series from
the pattern.
This approach gives expression to a common-sense
procedure that an analyst uses intuitively. He judges
that a correlation of such and such is "pretty good"
for "this type of data," whereas the same figure would
be "not very impressive".for another set of time series.
As suggested in the text, I have constantly resorted
to this sort of framework in pointing to the percentage
of months in like phase, which in the several and
different contexts seems to me to suggest meaningful
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or on order, and ask whether it explains the
behavior of stock in terms either of a desired
relationship or of one reflecting inevitable
error and its correction. I conclude that a
large amount of the behavior of stocks on
hand and particularly ofstocks on order
remains to be explained after any reasonable
association with sales has been taken into ac-
count. The residualis greater for durable
goods manufacturing than for retailing. It is
greater prior to 1961 than thereafter.
The next chapter turns to the residuals—
the portion of the behavior of stocks on hand
and on order that seems unexplained by the
pattern of sales. We examine the evidence
that suggests the role of market conditions
and of expectations with respect to changes
in delivery periods, prices, and backlogs of
sales orders. Attention is also given to whether
market expectations can be explained largely
in terms of capacity limitations of suppliers.
Chapter 11 looks at how the two major in-
fluences—sales and market conditions—com-
bine in shaping the unfolding historyof
changes in materials ownership and new or-
ders for materials; it leads to modification of
the usual formulations of the "acceleration
principle."
THE SALES LINK
Stocks could not, of course, fail to have some
sort of broad parallelism with sales, and Charts
2 and 4 have pictured this general association.
The association must in part reflect basic busi-
ness requirements which are too obvious to
discuss. Interest attaches rather to the par-
ticular quantitative characteristics of the paral-
lelism and its precision. What light can the
time series throw on these matters? Measures
of conformity and timing are reviewed in this
section and quantitative relationships in the
next.
Timing Relationships
Table 31assembles previously presented
measures of association between peaks and
troughs and specific cycle peaks and troughs.
In studying the location of turns alone, a gross
simplification is imposed on the history of
events: things may either improve or worsen,
and nothing else. Moreover, since it is not al-
ways crystal clear just when the reversal takes
place, there is often an arbitrary element in the
designations. The moment when a series be-
gins to descend, and therefore ceases to ascend,
may be compared with the analogous moment
in another series which may, not unreasonably,
be causally related to it. If these particular
moments (characterized by the fact that they
are moments of reversal) tend systematically
to, say, precede those of the first series, it seems
reasonable to assume that other moments also
would. In other words, a regression analysis
which allowed for the lead would show a
higher coefficient of correlation than one using
synchronous or other timing. This is the logic
of studying the specific cycle measures of tim-
ing and the percentage of months in phase.
For both department stores and durable
goods manufacturers, stocks turn two or three
months later than sales, on the average. Table
31, line 3, shows that, allowing for the three
months' lag, 80 and 84 per cent of the months,
respectively, are in like phase for the two
sorts of
The figures suggest some minimal systematic
association for both sorts of enterprises, and
comparison of the visual contours in Charts
2 and 4, above, support this conclusion. How-
ever,its meaning in terms of direct causal
association cannot be pushed very far, since
both sales and stocks move with general busi-
3Sincethere is no specific cycle in department store
sales prior to 1948, the retardation in the stock series
is bound to be out of phase. Limiting the comparisons
to January 1948 through December 1961, the per-
centage of months in phase for department stores is
82, and for durable goods manufacturers 83.TABLE 31
Summary of Timing association of Sales and Stocks on Hand and on Order,
Department Stores and Durable Goods Manufacturers, 1946-61
Table
LineSpecific Seriesa
Median Timing % in Like Phase
Lead (—)Lag(+)Timing
Reference SeriesaP T AllAdjust.
% of Months
7/46 to 12/611/48 to 12/61
Department Stores
1Ownership Sales +0.3 +2.0+1.0 +1 80 84
2Change in owner-
ship Change in sales +0.5 —0.5 0 0 84
3Stocks Sales +2.3 +5.0+3.0 +3 80 82
4Change in stocksChange in sales+4.0 +3.5+4.0+3, +4 81
5Change in stocksSales —6.3 —0.7—1.5 —1 71 74
6Outstandings Sales —4.3 +1.3—0.5 0 75
7Change in out-
standings Change in sales —1.5 —1.5—1.5 —2 80
8Sales Subcycles —1.0 —4.0—1.5 —1 83
9Change in salesSubcycles —11.5 —6.0 —10.0 —10 66
10Ownership Subcycles —0.5 —2.5—2.0 —2 82
11Stocks Subcycles +0.5 0 0 0 91









LineSpecific SeriesaReference SeriesaP TAllAdjust.12/6 112/6 1 Stores Durables
Durable Goods Manufacturing
IOwnership Shipments —1.5 —0.5—0.51, 0 72 75 15 6
2Change in owner-Change in ship-
ship ments —1.0 +1.0+0.7+1,0 76 20 18






ments +11.5 +7.3+9.3+4, +5
Shipments —2.7 —3.3—3.0 —2
70 20 18
81 87 20 18
6Outstandings Shipments —1.7 —0.7—1.0 —1 73 80 15 6
7Change in out-Change in ship-
standings ments —1.0 +0.7+0.30, +1 72 20 18
8Shipments Subcycles —1.7 +0.3 0 0 84 15 6
9Change in ship-
ments Subcycles —9.0 —6.7—8.7 —9 68 20 18
10Ownership Subcycles —4.0 +1.0—1.5 —2 75 9 1
11Stocks Subcycles +1.3 +3.7+3.0 +3 82 9 1
12Outstandings Subcycles —6.0 +0.5—2.5 —3 74 9 1
a"Stocks" are stocks of purchased materials. Outstandings are, of course, outstanding purchase
orders for materials. (The series is actually the unfilled sales orders of the primary metals, fabricated
metals, and "other" durables goods industries.)9. CAUSES OF FLUCTUATION IN OWNERSHIP: THE SALES LINK 165
ness conditions (Table 31, lines 8 and 11). We
cannot, therefore, rule out the possibility that
such similarity as the two series show is the
result of each of them moving in accord with
the general tides of business. Other relation-
ships serve to fill in this ambiguous picture.
Ownership is capable of prompt adjustment
to intentions, and its behavior istherefore
of interest. For durable goods, line 1 of the
table indicates a very poor association be-
tween ownership and shipments; only 72 of
the months are in like phase. And Charts 1
and 2,it will be recalled, revealed notably
different shapes, as well as timing, of cycles
in the two series. For department stores, on
the other hand, ownership and sales are in
like phase 80 per cent of the time after allow-
ing for a one-month lag in ownership. If com-
parison is confined to the period after 1948,
department stores are in phase 84 per cent
and durable goods manufacturing 75 per cent
of the time.
Rates of change in both sales and stocks
provide further evidence concerning manage-
ment objectives and their validation.Itis
possible for stocks and sales proper to be pre-
cisely in like phase and yet for first differences
in the two series to be in opposite phase for
a substantial part of the time. The relation-
ship between cycles in rates of change and
in data proper are diagramed below:
Thus data proper for two series could both
be rising; but if one was rising at an accelerat-
ing rate (box la'), and the other at a deceler-
ating rate (box id"), the rates of change for
the two series would be Out of phase. Analo-
gous remarks apply to falling phases. Itis
equally possible, of course, for phases in rates
of change in two series to be matched and the
data proper out of phase for substantial inter-
vals. This occurs in boxes 2a" and id" or
Ia" and 2d". Finally, of course, phases for
both data proper and rates of change for two
series can be matched (the a' and a" boxes),
thus indicating a more exacting parallelism
than for either characteristic alone. Which of
these several possibilities apply to the actual
data and to what degree?
For department stores, Table 31 shows that
change in stocks (inventory investment) was
in like phase with change in sales 81 per cent
of the months after allowing for a three- or
four-month lag. The lag, like that of stocks
with respect to sales proper, seems to reflect
some of the difficulties of effectuating inten-
tions. Note that it is not present for change
in ownership, which, on a synchronous basis,
is in phase with change in stock 84 per cent
of the months (line 2). Reference to Table
20, line5, indicates that twelve turns are
matched, only two of which diverge by more
than three months; seven turns are within
plus or minus one month of one another.
These figures then, and those for ownership
proper, seem to reflect some very determined
effort to keep stocks aligned with sales when
alignment is sensitive not merely to directional
change but to rates of change as well.
This double criterion is not exhibited for
durable goods manufacturers. The alignment
between rates of change in stocks of materi-
als and in shipments (line 4) or in owner-
ship and in shipments (line2) has about
the same average timing association as for
department stores. But phase-by-phase corre-
spondence is relatively sloppy; 70 per cent of
the months are in like phase for change in
stocks and 76 per cent for change in owner-
ship. Apparently, when sales are rising or
falling at declining rates, stocks do not usually
follow suit.
Line 5 of Table 31 suggests what they may
bedoing,though perhaps notforcefully
enough to carry much weight. For durable
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tend to bear a fairly systematic relation to
shipments proper. Allowing for a two-months
lead in inventory investment, changes in stocks
and shipments proper are in like phase 81
per cent of the whole period and 87 per cent
beginning in 1948, whereas the corresponding
figures for department stores are 68 and 71
per cent.
Do the figures for durables reflect a pur-
poseful effort to maintain this association be-
tween inventory investment and shipments
proper? If so, the logic would be obscure,
but even the evidence does not speak for it,
since change in ownership, for which valida-
tion of an objective is mechanically easy, has
a very unsystematic association with shipments
proper.4 A second explanation might be in
terms of adjustment lags. Hypothetically, the
effort to increase stocks as sales rise at first
succeeds only in the form of a retardation in
the fall in stocks (box la' for sales and 2d" for
stocks). Only after the rise in sales starts to
slow down do stocks manage to rise and at an
accelerating rate (box id' for sales and la" for
stocks). An association of this sort is in ac-
cord with the evidence. However, note that in
any event it could hardly result from a high
management priority to enforce a precise aver-
age or incremental association between sales
and stocks, in view particularly of the pos-
sibilityofforeknowledgeof requirements
which advance orders for finished goods im-
plies.
I conclude that the figures suggest a rela-
tively strong sales link for department stores
and a much weaker one for durable goods
manufacturers. That this is a sensible finding
seems implicit in the difference between the
procurement problems of retail merchants and
of manufacturers of durable goods.
For department stores, stock control isa
central management concern. A large part of
the capital of a retailer is invested in stocks.
Moreover,a departmentstore'scustomers
4Allowingfor a five-month lead, 71 per cent of the
months are in like phase.
make their selections primarily out of goods
in stock; poor stocks mean lost sales. However,
since at best the items that may be wanted are
vast in number, the natural tendency for stocks
to grow too large can only be kept in check
by carefully devised stock-control methods and
perpetual vigilance. A situation of this sort
virtually demands a sharply defined stock ob-
jective, the enforcement of which carries high
management priority.
For durable goods manufacturers, on the
other hand, stocks of materials account for only
a small part of total invested capital. A specific
unit of material often has only a loose physical
link to a specific finished article, since process-
ing is sufficiently flexible to use it as an in-
gredient in any one of a number of finished
items. Obviously, the penalty for a relaxed
link of sales-to-materials stocks is far smaller
than for department stores. At the same time,
a durable goods manufacturer would tech-
nically be in a better position to keep ship-
ments and materialsstrictlyaligned than
would a retailer. His customers are often will-
ing to wait, whereas those of department stores
are not. The advance knowledge of projected
shipments that order backlogs provide can be
the basis of materials buying capable of en-
forcing a stock objective: both the inflow to
and the outflow from the stockpile, receipts
and production starts, can be predetermined.
Even the two- or three-month lag of stocks
relative to shipments seems to evidence a weak
sales-linkedintentionformanufacturers,
whereas for retailers it could simply reflect the
absence of the clairvoyant's capacity to fore-
tell sales.
The examination of one sort of evidence,
then, data on timing and confluence of fluctu-
ations, seems to suggest the inevitable link of
stocks or total ownership to sales. The associa-
tion tends to be synchronous for ownership,
whereas stocks lag about three months. But
for department stores the figures seem to show
a substantially tighter and more pervasive
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goods manufacturers. That this would be the
case seems implicit in the differences in the
business operations that the two sorts of enter-
prises perform.
Quantitative Relationships
The evidence examined is of course most
incomplete. For one thing, we have looked
at relations between one of the factors that
could influence stocks and sales, whereas there
are necessarily other factors too; the joint
impact of sales plus the others could easily
obscure the effect of sales, other things the
same. For another thing, our measures have
been concerned not with either sales or stocks
but, as mentioned at the start, a schematic rep-
resentation of both—in effect, a sequence of
triangles marked off by the low and high
months of movements identified as specific
cycles or minor cycles. The height of the peaks
and troughs and the pattern of intervening
months have been largely ignored. Ratios of
stocks to sales provide a steppingstone around
both limitations. It is necessary to try to take
this further information into account.
MORE THAN PROPORTIONAL RISE OR FALL
One type of quantitative relationship be-
tween sales and stocks, one with a venerable
analytic history in economics, isthat of a
constant average relationship. Yet we saw, on
the one hand, in Chapter 2 that there is little
reason to suppose that a close adherence to
management rules, directed toward efficient
servicing of sales, other things the same, would
produce a constant ratio. The empirical data,
on the other hand, showed that in fact stocks
not only increased as much as sales but in-
creased more during substantial periods of
either business expansion or expansion in
sales. And it seems reasonable to interpret this
behavior as intended, at least in some loose
sense, since when sales are rising, stocks are
not likely to back up unexpectedly.
For department stores, the ratio of stocks on
hand to sales rose in 59 per cent of the months
during which sales themselves rose; for the
ownership-sales ratio the corresponding figure
was 68 per cent. For durable goods manufac-
turers, the comparable percentages were 44
and 37respectively. Table 32 gives these
figures.
The beginning of the more than propor-
tional rise in stocks does not wait for the
latest stages of expansion in sales but starts
within a year of its commencement.5
Ownership started to rise faster than sales
or shipments within eight months ofthe
trough in the flow series or, for that matter,
the trough in business cycles except for the
long, lag after the 1961 trough. A glance at
Charts 3 and 5 will help to recall the appear-
ance of these ratios.
During contractions in sales, a rise in the
ratio might mean either that stocks could not
be reduced at all or that they could not be
reduced fast enough to keep pace with the fall
in sales. And certainly either of these situa-
tions could well occur, however lamented by
management. But a decline in the ratio—stocks
falling faster than sales—would, like a rise
during expansion, seem intended in the sense
that it must result from efficacious purposeful
procedures. Table 32 shows that stocks were
falling faster than sales for only 40 per cent
of the months for department stores and 36
per cent for manufacturers. Several months
elapsed after the peak in sales before stocks
started to fall, and several more before their
rate of fall passed that of sales. The median
lag for peaks in the ratio relative to those in
sales was four months for department stores
and nine for Certainly the lag rep-
resents a failure of control mechanisms, and it
is interesting that again control is closer for
department stores than for the manufacturers.
5Anexception was a lag of fourteen months after
the 1954 trough for the department store data referred
to here and in the following paragraph. These and
subsequently mentioned figures are from Table 8,
lines 3, 7 and 13; and Table 17, lines 4, 9, and 14.
0Timingcomparisons were given in Tables 17 and 8.168 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
TABLE 32
Comparison Between Sales and the Stock-Sales Ratio
Department Stores and Durable Goods Manufacturers
1948-1961
Sales Risinga SalesFallinga
% of months % ofmonths









Note: "Sales" signify sales of department stores or shipments of
all durable goods manufacturers.
aAll comparisons cover the months January 1948to December
1961. Months of rise (fall) in sales or shipments are delineated by
the location of specific or minor specific cycles and likewise for the
ratios. Figures in column I were originally presented in Tables 7 and
16. Those in column 2 have not been previously given.
Ownership, on the other hand, was brought
in line much faster, and the ratio declined
during 66 and 88 per cent of contraction
months respectively for department stores and
durables. This high correspondence was as-
sociated with the fact that the ratio sometimes
started to fall before sales reversed, and in no
cases waited longer than three months for de-
partment stores and four or five months for
In general, then, such directional parallel-
ism as we observed previously between stocks
and sales had the further characteristic that
7ChartsS and 5 bring out the fact that for durable
goods the ownership.shipments ratio declined for sub-
stantially more months than it rose. This explains in
part both the low conformity of the ratio with ship-
ments during expansions and the high conformity dur-
ing contractions.
stocks on hand and on order rise relatively
more than sales during a substantial portion
of the time that sales rise; an analogous state-
ment applies to the fall in total ownership,
though not to that of stocks alone.
HYPOTHETICALLY EFFICIENT SERVICE STOCK
If I am correct in thinking that, were all
other factors to remain the same, the efficient
sales link would not dictate increases or de-
creases of these magnitudes, then it must be
concluded that other factors have not in fact
remained the same. How great a part of the
total fluctuation in stocks may result from
the impact of these factors?
I know of no way to answer this question
with confidence at the present time. We can
neithersimulatethetypical management9. CAUSES OF FLUCTUATION IN OWNERSHIP: THE SALES LINK 169
procedure for linking stocks to sales, other
things the same (this requires knowledge of
management conduct which we do not have)
nor can we (as explained at the start of the
chapter) resort to the time series, represent
all relevant variables that affect the size of
stocks including that of sales, and see how
much of the total variance sales explain.
Nevertheless, I want to make three assump-
tions and see what they imply. I apply them
to ownership and not to stocks alone. The
choice is conditioned by the need to concen-
trate on intended behavior. The basic pro-
cedure is first to determine sales-linked stocks
by applying some assumption about the char-
acter of the link between stocks and specific
cycle fluctuation in sales, and second to com-
pare the fluctuation in ownership so gener-
ated with the actual fluctuation during specific
cycles in ownership. The difference is attrib-
uted to influences other than those of sales.
The picture is confused insofar as unin-
tended change is caught up and displayed in
the comparison, for unintended change can be
generated by error in estimating either sales,
market conditions, or any other relevant con-
sideration. But unplanned stocks of both the
passive and unintended sort distort the pat-
tern of stock on hand far more, it seems reason-
able to believe, than they do the pattern of
total materials ownership. The timing associa-
tions as well as the logic point to this con-
clusion. For ownership, then, it seems permis-
sible to consider the total specific fluctuation
in ownership as more or less intended and
compare it with the sales-linked part of this
total as defined in terms of a specified relation-
ship to the total specific fluctuation in sales.8
The assumptions concerning the efficient sales-
8An alternative would be to confine examination
to what occurred to ownership during specific cycles
in sales only (that is, not those in ownership itself).
But thisautomaticallyrules out thepossibility of
viewing the impact of factors whose incidence may not
precisely parallel that of sales. In Chapter 11 we make
a calculation of this sort because we ask this specific
question.
stock link, other things assumed unchanged,
are:
Assumption A. Efficient service requirements
are defined as change in ownership which is
proportional to the change in sales when the
proportional relationship is specified by the
low points in the actual relationship (the
figure used is the average for specific cycle
troughs in the ratio). This assumption pre-
sumably makes the sales-linked portion of
change in ownership unrealistically high, and
consequently the part requiring further ex-
planation correspondingly too low. Neverthe-
less, for department stores, an average of three-
quarters of the increase in ownership during
each specific expansion is accounted for by this
assumption, and accordingly one-quarter by
factors other than sales. The cycle-by-cycle
figures are given in Table 33, line lOa. For
durable goods manufacturers, the correspond-
ing hypothetical sales-linked portion of own-
ership developed in Table 34, also averages
three-quarters of the total, and the percentage
increases over the period (line lOa).° It ac-
counts for more than the total during the
1958—59 expansion and during the first year
of the expansion starting early in 1961 (Table
34, line lOa).
Assumptions B and C. Both share the basic
assumption that the efficient sales-service link
implies a constant incremental association,
plus buffer stocks changing according to a
square-root principle. The two assumptions
differ only with respect to the size of the
ratios that were used.
The incremental ratios that I have selected
are in all cases smaller than the average ratio
of ownership to sales over the years. For de-
partment stores, the average ratio was close
to four months' supply. However, I have as-
sumed (C) that if sales are expected to rise,
ownership need rise no more than two times
the size of the expected increase. I think of
9Theincrease would have been much more marked
had not the downward trend in the ratios been recog-













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0172 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
Notes to Table 33
aAssumptions are (A) the ownership-sales
ratio is constant anditslevel is averaged for
the three major troughs; (B) the ratio of change
in ownership to change in sales (incremental
ratio)is constant at1.5 months; sales plus
allowance for insurance stock; (C) same as B,
but an incremental ratio of 2 months' sales.
bThe ratio of 3.74 is applied to the standings
at peaks and troughs; rises and falls are cal-
culated using these figures.
cThe formula utilizing the Poisson distri-
bution, at a level that permits stockouts 1 per
centof thetimeis2.33 D isI
month's sales, T (The replenishment period)
this as consisting of about an extra six weeks'
supply on hand and two weeks' on order.'°
Analogous remarks apply to falls. Assumption
B Cuts the incremental requirement to six
weeks' supply. For durable goods manufactur-
ers, the same figures were used—the B and C
assumption isthat change in sales require
changes in materials ownership one and a half
times and two times as large respectively. I
picture the distribution for durables as con-
sisting of two weeks on hand under both as-
sumptions whereas four weeks and six weeks
are held on order under B and C respectively.
II am afraid that the C assumption is rather
too large. To apply these relationships to the
data, the ratios are cut in half to allow for
value added in the sales dollar. The specifics
of the calculation are given in notes to Tables
33 and 34. I shall not repeat them, since it is
probably simpler to study the details of the
calculation in connection with thefigures
themselves.
The logic that underlies selections is con-
tained in Chapter 2. An incremental ratio
that is substantially smaller than the average
ratio implies that the level of total stocks is
supported by a number of things which, on the
one hand, it is not desirable to duplicate and,
on the other hand, not worthwhile to elim-
inate—thehistoryofpreviouspurchases,
some less successful than others, the need to
10Forconvenience I have equated two weeks with
half a month.
is assumed to be1month, and N (The order
interval)2 weeks; thus we solve for 2.33,J1.5(D).
dNote that these ratios round to the same
figure because line5 represents so small a
portion of the total and does not vary enough
to change the number and the second decimal
place.
°To illustrate: Trough standing of owner-
ship,6/49, from line8 (1255.0) plus sales-
linked rise in ownership, 7/49 to 1/51, from
line 4a (242.3) =hypotheticalstanding under
assumption A of 1497.3. This divided by sales
from line 2 is or 3.59.
carry slow-moving items, the need in some
cases to make long forward commitments, the
cost of tailoring stock to precise requirements.
I do not hold any special brief for the par-
ticular parameters that were chosen, and it
might be interesting to try some further al-
ternatives. But I think that the C lines at any
rate define efficient sales-service requirements
sufficiently liberally to provide a very conserv-
ative estimate of the portion of ownership
that must be explained in terms of "other
factors." "
11 Analternative calculation, on which it may be
useful to report, was tried and abandoned. The factors
that determine the average,as distinguished from
the incremental, association are, in one sense at least,
also part of what may be thought of as an efficient
sales-ownership relationship. They imply that higher
levels of sales require higher levels of ownership. But
the dynamics of the association would seem to involve
long-term influences that settle back into these over-
all relationships rather than anything that needs to
be, or indeed should be, an explicit management goal.
This line of thought suggests that a simulation of
an efficient sales-ownership link might have two parts:
(1) a trend part that takes account of an increase in
ownership corresponding to the long-term trend in
sales,(2)acyclical partbuilt on an incremental
principle.
I made such calculations for expansions, but found
that they came to grief when they were applied to
contractions.For durablegoods,asix-week incre-
mental ratio was used to define the cyclical component
of sales-linked change in ownership. Total sales-linked
change—trend plus cycle—represented 51 per cent of
the total actual increase in ownership. This figure is
comparable to that of 58 per cent for the two-month
incremental relationship alone (see text below). The
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































49. CAUSES OF FLUCTUATION IN OWNERSHIP: THE SALES LINK 175
Notes to Table 34
highpointin1962, which does not
constitute a specific cycle peak, provides an
additionalcomparison.Itis not included in
the averages.
bAssumptjons are: (A) An average ratio of
ownershiptoshipments properapplies. The
level of the ratio is indicated by its position
at troughs. Since these are subject to a con-
stant downward trend, values are read from a
straight line on semi-log paper visually fitted
tothe3troughvalues.(B) An incremental
ratioofchangeinownershiptochange in
shipments applies; the ratio istakenat1.5
months; shipments (two weeks on hand and one
monthonorder).But since value added is
presumably about half of value of product, the
equivalen.tbook valueof materials adjusted
for value added is = .75months; sales. (C)
The ratio is taken at 2 months, sales; adjusted
for value added, it is a ratio of 1.0.
CThe ratios read from the trend line at each
The tables show that for assumption C the
sales-linked portion oftotal actual specific
cycle expansions in ownership is, hypotheti-
cally, 42 per cent and for durable goods 58 per
cent. During contractions for either type of
enterprise it was only 35 per cent (Tables 33
and 34, line lOc). As we have seen in several
contexts, the sales-linked aspect played a larger
relative part in the latefifties and in the
sixties than in the earlier postwar years. This
was particularly true of durable goods manu-
facturers. Indeed our calculations show that
for the first year of the prosperity of the sixties
(the only portion of the long expansion for
which figures consistent with earlier years are
available) virtually the entire change would
one-monthincremental component, was 52percent
(as compared with 42percent for the two-month
incremental supply).
I abandoned these estimates because of their im-
plicationabout the efficient relationship during con-
tractions. The assumptionthatthetrendrisein
ownership should continue through contractions (and
otherwise what is the meaning of a "trend"?) virtually
ruled out an "efficient" sales-linked absolute decline
in ownership, particularly for department stores. This
does not seem at all sensible.
peakortroughmonth were appliedto the
standing of shipments. The ratios used (see
noteb) were,12/481.79,10/491.77, 7/53
1.60, 10/54 1.55, 1/57 1.47, 4/58 1.42, 6/59
1.38,1/611.33, 4/62 1.29. Changes between
thesehypotheticalhand-to-mouthlevelsof
ownershipconstitutetheentriesinline 4a.
dTheformula_utilizing the Poisson distri-
bution,2.33JD(T-1-N), wasapplied under the
assumptionthat the replenishment period, D,T
was6 weeks and,the order interval 2 weeks.
Thusthevarianceallowanceisfor2.33
mo.shipments.Adjustingtoallow for
valueadded and thefigure_to 1mo.; e.g.,
2.33 J7,860 =207,2.33 J6736 =191,change
in buffer 16.
illustrate: Trough study of ownership
9/49fromline8(12,533) plus sales-linked
riseinownership10/49to7/53from line
4a (4,544)=hypotheticalstanding under as-
sumptionA of 21,080- This divided by shipments
7/53from line 2 is 1.65.
beattributed to the sales link under the C as-
sumption. Ifthe linked extrapolations(as
charted) are used to extend the relationship,
even the B assumption overexplains the entire
actual change in ownership..
The same set of contrasts can be evaluated
in somewhat different terms by examining the
relations between ownership and sales that are
implied. In the first place, note that the actual
incremental ratios (the relation between spe-
cific cycle changes in ownership and in sales)
are substantially larger than the average ratios
(the relation between the level of ownership
and the level of sales taken at peaks and
troughs)—6.75 and 3.96 for department stores.
For durable goods manufacturers the figures
are 2.75 and 1.69, which, adjusted for value
added, would be about 5.50 and 3.38 (last
column, lines 11 and 13 in both tables). It
is also noteworthy that the difference dwindles
very markedly in the later years of the period
under study.
Businessmen seem to speak and think pri-
marily in terms of average ratios. It seems odd,
therefore, that the marked differences between176 SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS
average and incremental ratiosis not well
publicized. Itis possible that the reason is
simply that unless attention is actually fo-
cused on the increments, it would be easy not
to notice the disparity. The average ratios per-
haps do not change enough as a result of the
incremental change to call executive attention
to discrepancies between plans and actuality.
For example, would a ratio of 4.1 (4.0 if the
Korean peak were excluded) at peaks in de-
partment store sales and ownership be noted
as clearly different from the trough ratio of
3.9(line13)? For durable goods manufac-
turers, the same question applies to ratios in
book-value terms of 1.8 and 1.6.12
I raise the question without knowing the
answer. But if itis true that differences of
this order do not flash blinking lights in man-
agement offices,perhaps the same line of
thought would help to explain why actual in-
cremental ratios can depart so far from those
which represent efficient servicing of sales,
other things the same. For department stores,
the actual ratios at peaks in sales averaged
4.0 months of sales if the Korean episode is
excluded, and the same figure applies to peaks
in the ratio itself. If the incremental ratio had
been constant at the trough average (assump-
12Thisquestion may mean that one ought to think
in terms of the actual experienced ratios and their
peak and trough differences. For the periods covered
in the tables, the average standing of the ratios for
department stores at their specific cyde peaks, ex-
cluding the Korean episode, was also 4.0; for troughs
it was 3.7. For durables, the peak and trough ratios
were 2.1 and 1.6 respectively; excluding the Korean
episode, they were 1.8 and 1.6.
tion A), the peak standings would have aver-
aged 3.8. If the incremental ratio of 2 had been
applied, the peak standings would have aver-
aged 3.6 (summary columns, lines 13a—c). Do
differences of this order present problems to
managements? They may realize stock can be
economized while business improves, but the
need to do so may not seem urgent. For du-
rable goods manufacturers the peak ratio ac-
tually experienced averaged1.8,excluding
Korea. At peaks the ratio averaged 1.5 under
assumption A and 1.4 under assumption C.
I wish I could rephrase these questions to
apply to stock on hand rather than to total
materials ownership. But, as mentioned ear-
lier, the unintended aspect of change in stocks
leaves me baffled. In any event, the question
that I raiseis simply whether the implied
change in ownership associated with factors
other than change in sales is of an order of
magnitude which is likely to worry executives
trained in the constant-ratio rule of thumb.
Most of the other influences with which this
study is so particularly concerned can perhaps
be sheltered under the generous umbrella
of what passes for a constant-average ratio,
tilted a bit this way in recognition of good
times and that way in recognition of bad times.
If so,itis an interesting arithmetic which
can produce figures that appear unimportant
at a micro-economic level, but have highly
significant implications for the economy at
large.
What, then, are some of these other factors
that influence ownership?